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Juan M. Villasuso* 
At the end of the 1970s G>sta Rica was hie by the 
worst crisis in its history. The coffee boom ended 
abruptly in 1978, causing a sizeable drop in export 
earnings. Furthermore, public spending increased 
sharply, generating a deficit which was financed 
largely by short-term foreign borrowing. In addition, 
the exchange-rate slippage, in conjunction with the 
deterioration in the terms of trade, brought about the 
exhaustion of monetary reserves, and this situation 
was exacerbated even further by the higher interest 
rates in the international market. 
The gross domestic product fell 10% between 
1980 and 1982, the fiscal deficit amounted t o 4 2 % of 
revenue and 22% of gross domestic product, the 
devaluation totalled 600%, and per capita income 
declined 25%. It is estimated that the country lost 
24% of its income owing to the worsening of the 
terms of trade, the payment of interest on the debt, 
and remittance of profits abroad. When this situa-
tion became insupportable, the Government decided 
to defer payment of the debt. Meanwhile, unemploy-
ment and inflation, scourges virtually unknown in 
the past, climbed to unprecedented levels. 
The new Government which came to office in 
1982 set out to cut the fiscal deficit and dampen 
expectations of devaluation. To this end ¡t took a 
number of steps which, together with international 
financial aid, helped to rebalance the fiscal and exter-
nal accounts and thus facilitate the renegotiation of 
the debt and the agreement of a new adjustment 
programme with the International Monetary Fund. 
Agriculture saw its contribution to the gross 
domestic product fall from 50% in 1977 to 37% in 
1985, mainly owing to the behaviour of coffee prices 
in the international market. The steps taken to coun-
ter this trend and to stimulate exports growth and 
diversification do not seem to have been successful. 
The sharp devaluations apparently facilitated an 
increase in export earnings but not in export 
volumes, for the products in question were subject to 
export agreements or quotas. 
•Economist. Consultant to the Joint ECLAC/FAO 
Agriculture Division. 
I 
The situation up to de 1970s 
Up to the end of the 1950s Costa Rica's agricul-
tural sector absorbed about 5 5 % of the economi-
cally active population, generated some 90% of 
export earnings, and contributed 40% of the 
country's gross domestic product. The relatively 
small public sector was concerned mainly with 
the provision of services and creation of infras-
tructure. The population and most of the activi-
ties were concentrated in the central region. 
In the 1960s the Government began to 
encourage industrialization based on imports 
substitution. The country took an active part in 
the integration agreements which led to the 
establishment of the Central American Com-
mon Market, with a view to having access to a 
large and protected market. The hope was to 
obtain high growth rates by means of this indus-
trial development and thus to increase employ-
ment, improve incomes and eliminate poverty. 
It was likewise hoped to reduce the country's 
vulnerability, for its foreign trade was entirely 
dependent on agriculture. 
The steps taken to promote industrial activi-
ties, basically the set of instruments contained in 
the Industrial Protection Law promulgated in 
1959 and the Central American Agreement on 
Fiscal Incentives, had almost immediate results. 
Industry grew 9.4% a year on average 
between 1965 and 1973 and increased its contri-
bution to the gross domestic product from 16% 
to 20%. Industrial jobs also increased, to 12% of 
the total in 1963 and to 15% in 1978, a propor-
tion which has remained constant. 
Agriculture, however, saw its share of 
employment fall from 50% in 1963 to 30% in 
1983 and, what is more, it shed manpower. The 
workers who left agriculture and those entering 
the labour market for the first time were largely 
absorbed by the growing industrial sector and by 
the public sector, which underwent a large 
expansion. The public sector provided barely 
6% of jobs in 1950 but by 1983 it had increased 
its share to 19%. 
The new development model enabled the 
country to modernize the economy and establish 
an extensive network of communications, trans-
port infrastructure and manpower training sys-
tems, as well as a wide range of commercial and 
financial services. 
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II 
The structural problems 
This development model soon began to exhibit a 
number of undesirable features. On the one 
hand, these included consumption patterns 
which had a high imported component and a low 
savings coefficient, equivalent to about 6% to 
7 % of the national income; this caused the coun-
try to resort to foreign borrowing to finance the 
accumulation of capital. On the other hand, 
neither the highly protected industrial sector, 
nor the primary sector were capable of placing 
very much of their production outside the Cen-
tral American market. Furthermore, some of the 
specific policies adopted encouraged a techno-
At the end of the 1970s a combination of pheno-
mena —structural and contingent, external and 
internal— produced the worst crisis ever expe-
rienced by the country in all its history. One of 
the main factors in the crisis was the oil price rise 
and its impact on domestic prices. The first 
increase in 1973 did not have serious consequen-
ces because the country had an adequate supply 
of external financing and coffee, the main export 
product, was trading at high prices in the inter-
national market. 
Costa Rica's terms of trade underwent a sus-
tained decline in 1970-1976. In 1974 the ratio 
was only 78.6% against the 100% of 1970, for 
although export prices increased almost every 
year, import prices rose at a faster rate. 
The Government took a much more active 
role between 1970 and 1978, especially with 
respect to investment, which was financed by 
foreign borrowing on generally advantageous 
terms. The aim was to alter the production struc-
ture in order to increase exports of manufactured 
goods with a high domestic component. Invest-
ments were made in production plants for 
logical pattern heavily dependent on imported 
goods. 
When the need subsequently emerged for 
adjustment of the development model, a number 
of measures were introduced, including in partic-
ular the creation of the Exports and Investments 
Promotion Centre, the granting of tax exemp-
tions on non-traditional exports to markets out-
side Central America, exports incentives, and 
the establishment of the Development Corpora-
tion of Costa Rica which, with its subsidiary 
bodies, was intended to diversify the production 
structure and promote the use of domestic raw 
materials. 
cement, aluminium and derivatives, and anhy-
drate alcohol, amongst others. 
A number of incentives were introduced in 
the rural sector for enterprises which set up in 
the countryside and constructed transport and 
communications infrastructure works. The 
Government also intervened in the installation 
of processing plants for commodities such as 
cotton. 
These and other measures cushioned the 
effect of the deterioration in the terms of trade. 
The inflow of capital to finance public invest-
ment was sufficient to obviate recourse to deva-
luation to cover the increasing external 
imbalance. Stimulated by the investments, pro-
duction grew at a rate of 6% and unemployment 
accordingly remained low, at a rate of under 5 %. 
The foreign exchange earnings helped to 
counter inflationary pressures by enabling 
imports to grow in step with the expanding 
demand. 
The dramatic recovery of the economy as a 
result of the rise in export prices in 1977 was 
reflected in a considerable improvement in the 
III 
The crisis 
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country's external accounts, which made adjust-
ment of the exchange rate seem unnecessary. 
Against this background, with good coffee pri-
ces, the Government contracted more foreign 
loans to finance new public investments. 
After the change of Government in 1978, 
economic policy goals gave emphasis to private 
initiative in the allocation of resources and 
assigned a marginal role to the Government. 
That year coffee prices fell 6.7%, putting an 
end to the boom, and the situation worsened 
sharply. Despite the declared objectives, public 
spending rose 52% between 1978 and 1979, 
while revenue rose only 28%. As a result, invest-
ment fell and the deficit had to be financed by 
short-term foreign borrowing. 
The maintenance of the exchange rate was 
another objective given preference even at the 
expense of other variables. As a result of the 
level of debt and the use of international 
reserves, the colón was maintained at 8.60 to the 
dollar. 
The terms of trade continued to worsen, 
monetary reserves were depleted and became 
negative in 1980, and the foreign debt became a 
burden difficult to bear. The outbreak of the 
international financial crisis meant a smaller 
supply of resources for lending and higher inter-
est rates. 
In view of this critical situation, the currency 
was devalued. In 1981 the gross domestic pro-
duct recorded a negative rate for the first time 
(-4.6% ). However, public spending continued to 
grow in that year, at a rate of 10%. The fiscal 
deficit rose to 41.8% of revenue and 21.8% of 
gross domestic product. The fall in the gross 
domestic product continued in 1982, at a rate of 
-8.9%. 
The gloomy prospect prompted the authori-
ties to take two important steps: they imposed 
taxes on export activities and resorted to inter-
nal borrowing. The taxes on foreign trade even-
tually amounted to 66% of new tax revenue, and 
the public sector took up 44.7% of the loans of 
the national banking system. 
In March 1980 agreement was reached with 
the International Monetary Fund on a two-year 
stabilization programme designed to reduce the 
fiscal deficit and the current account deficit of the 
balance of payments. Of the SDR 60.5 million 
approved, only 15.4 million were disbursed, 
owing to failure to comply with the agreement. 
In June 1981 an expanded service arrange-
ment with the Fund replaced the earlier agree-
ment, making SDR 276.8 million available to the 
country for a period of three years. Of this 
amount, only 22.5 million was actually disbursed, 
again owing to failure to meet the agreed targets. 
In August that year the debt service became 
insupportable and the country decided to defer 
payment. The currency was devalued by 600% 
between 1981 and 1982 and, because of the 
urgent need to finance essential imports, the 
debt was concentrated in short-term obligations. 
The gross domestic product fell at a rate of about 
10% between 1980 and 1982, and output 
reverted to its 1977 level, while per capita 
income fell 25%. It is estimated that interest 
payments on the debt, the deterioration of the 
terms of trade, and the remittance of profits 
abroad by foreign companies together took 24% 
of the country's revenue. 
Inflation, a process virtually unknown in the 
country up till then, broke out in 1982, forcing 
the consumer price index above 100%. The 
result was a profound change in the costs struc-
ture in the production of goods and a decline in 
workers' real incomes of about 4 5 % between 
1979 and 1982. 
Open unemployment increased rapidly in 
this situation, affecting in particular wage 
earners in the modern sector and rural dwellers, 
especially the youngest. Unemployment among 
young people aged 15 to 19 reached 18% in 
1982. 
This deterioration in the situation can be 
clearly appreciated when it is remembered that 
the cost of the basic shopping basket took about 
60% of the average wage in 1980 but 86% in 
1982. 
1. The manifestations of the crisis 
The most important manifestations of the crisis 
included the fall in output, the external imbalan-
ces and the fiscal deficit. 
The growth rate of the gross domestic pro-
duct began to slow down in 1977, reaching a rate 
of 0.8% in 1980; in 1981 it fell in absolute terms 
for the first time, recording a rate of -4.6%. The 
rate was -8.9% in 1982; this trend was reversed 
in 1983 but without a return to the earlier rates. 
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This development was due to the following 
causes, amongst others: 
— The restriction of lending to the private 
sector. Domestic credit was cut back by the 
sharp increase in resources for the public 
sector, while external credit declined owing 
to the difficulties connected with the tight-
ening of the international financial markets; 
— The higher production costs caused by infla-
tion, devaluation of the currency and 
increased interest rates; 
— The contraction of aggregate demand as a 
result of the drop in real wages and the 
stagnation of external demand; 
— The climate of uncertainty in the business 
world, which led to a fall in private invest-
ment and an outflow of capital from the 
country; 
— The development of speculative financial 
activities whose profitability made them 
more attractive than the production of 
goods. 
Although the problems of the external sec-
tor are many and complex, for the purposes of 
this article they can be reduced to two: the trade 
balance deficit and the large foreign debt. 
The trade balance deficit dates back to the 
mid-1950s and is due to the stronger growth in 
the value of imports in comparison with exports. 
Exports accounted for 2 3 % of the gross domes-
tic product in 1970 and 30% in 1980, while the 
contribution of imports was 25% and 40% 
respectively. In these circumstances the trade 
deficit, which was equivalent to 40% of exports 
in 1970, rose to 60% in 1980. 
This situation was brought about, among 
other factors, by the heavy dependency on 
imported raw materials and capital goods, a con-
sumption pattern with a large imported content, 
the sustained decline in the terms of trade, and 
the weak performance of exports, especially 
non-traditional ones, as a result of the powerful 
protection —both internal and in the Central 
American Common Market— and the very con-
servative behaviour of businessmen. 
The methods used to cover the trade balance 
deficit were foreign borrowing and foreign 
investment, with the first being the more impor-
tant. The public foreign debt rose from US$900 
million in 1978 to over US$3 000 million in 
1982. The structure of the debt worsened in this 
period, with concentration of payments in the 
short term. The debt service, moreover, 
amounted to 60% of the value of exports. 
2. Income distribution and poverty 
In 1977 2 5 % of all Costa Rican families were 
unable to meet their basic needs to some extent 
and 13% lived in extreme poverty. The rural 
areas contained 34% of poor families and 19% 
of extremely poor families. No great change 
occurred in this situation until the outbreak of 
the crisis and the introduction of the adjustment 
policies. A comparison of 1970 with 1983 shows 
that the share of the poor sections of the popula-
tion in income declined in favour of the higher-
income groups; this was mainly an urban 
phenomenon. Furthermore, according to a 
MIDEPLAN study, 41.7% of wage earners were 
poor in 1980, and this proportion rose to 56.4% 
in 1981 and 70.7% in 1982, indicating the 
impoverishment of wage earners as a result of 
the crisis and the adjustment. The causes must be 
sought in the drop in real wages and employ-
ment, the higher public tariffs, and the cutback 
in government assistance programmes. 
The same study offers more dramatic figures 
for the rural sector. Poor rural families made up 
57.7% of the total in 1980, and this proportion 
rose to 72.1% in 1981 and 82.3% in 1982. The 
rate of child undernutrition among poor rural 
families was double the national average. 
No specific research on the food supply has 
been carried out since 1971. However, analysis of 
the development of the apparent supply shows 
no major falls in aggregate terms in the main 
foods in the basic shopping basket. In other 
words, a "normal" supply of rice, beans, maize, 
meat, milk and eggs was still guaranteed despite 
the reduced supply of foreign exchange. It is not 
possible to draw any definitive conclusions from 
this information, for it refers to aggregates and 
does not indicate the effects of changes in 
income distribution. 
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IV 
Description of the main adjustment policies 
With the change of Government in 1982, a 
seríes of measures was adopted with the aim, 
on the one hand, of reducing the fiscal deficit 
—considered to be the main generator of 
inflation— and, on the other hand, of 
reorganizing the exchange market in order to 
reduce the high level of expenditure and 
discourage expectations of devaluation. These 
measures included: 
— Modification of the exchange-rate régime. 
Purchase and sale of foreign currency was 
restricted to the Central Bank and its autho-
rized agents in the banking system. This 
checked speculation and expectation of a 
devaluation. 
— Measures to adjust the fiscal deficit. In view 
of the rigidities in expenditure, it was 
decided to make adjustments on the income 
side by means of increases in public tariffs, 
fuel prices and income tax, and the introduc-
tion of new export taxes based on the 
exchange-rate differential, together with 
import taxes and reduction of certain subsi-
dies. In addition, enterprises of the Develop-
ment Corporation of Costa Rica (CODESA) 
were put up for sale, and the rates of contri-
bution to the social security system were 
increased. 
The large increase in fiscal revenue achieved 
by the introduction of these measures reduced 
the non-financial fiscal deficit from 8.6% in 
1982 to 3.7% in 1983, despite an increase in 
public expenditure of 44.5% in nominal terms. 
The adjustment achieved by these methods 
enabled the country to resume its negotiations 
with the International Monetary Fund and 
reschedule its foreign debt, thus gaining access to 
the international financing which it needed. 
In December 1982 a new standby arrange-
ment was agreed with the International Mone-
tary Fund for SDR 92.25 million for a period of 
three years. Disbursements remained subject to 
attainment of the goals, which consisted basi-
cally of reduction of the fiscal deficit to 4.5% of 
the gross domestic product, reorganization of 
the foreign-exchange market, and containment 
of inflation. This time the programme was car-
ried out and the payments were made as 
planned, for most of the proposed targets were 
attained and even better results were achieved. 
With respect to the foreign debt, an agreement 
was reached with foreign banks on rescheduling 
of the payments; a similar agreement was 
reached with the Club of Paris on the external 
public debt. 
In order to offset the social costs of the 
adjustment, the Government introduced a 
number of specific measures such as the plan to 
rescue businesses hit by the crisis and the Social 
Compensation Plan, which included the provi-
sion of food for extremely poor families, half-
yearly adjustment of wages in step with changes 
in the prices of the items in the basic shopping 
basket, control of these prices, a programme to 
create jobs by means of subsidies, a social hous-
ing programme, and a land provision 
programme. 
Attention must necessarily be drawn to the 
role played by foreign aid in overcoming the 
crisis. In 1983 and 1984 the United States, 
through the International Development 
Agency, provided more than 25% of the exter-
nal resources received by Costa Rica. If the con-
tributions of bodies in which the United States 
Government has a decisive influence are 
included, the total comes to 8 3 % of the external 
resources in 1983 and 6 5 % in 1984. In the first 
three years of the Government of President 
Monge, United States assistance through the 
IDA amounted to US$634 million. Clearly the 
success of the stabilization programme owes 
much to these amounts of aid, which reduced the 
independence of the national authorities. 
Accordingly, the IMF and IDA have imposed 
their views on economic management. In 1984, 
for example, the IDA made a loan conditional on 
modification of the organic law of the Central 
Bank in order to give private banks access to that 
institution's resources. 
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V 
The impact of the adjustment policies on agriculture 
Since 1975 Costa Rica's farming economy has 
followed a pattern of irregular growth with peri-
ods of definite stagnation. More or less every 
three years the sector experienced large drops in 
its output (negative growth of the gross domes-
tic product), alternating with years of great 
expansion, 1983 and 1984, for example, when it 
recorded growth rates of 9-2% and 8% respec-
tively. This phenomenon is explained partly by 
the performance of two items, coffee and bana-
nas, which have a great impact on the sectoral 
economy. After a period of recovery, coffee out-
put fell sharply in 1985 and the same happened 
to bananas, which were already showing some 
weakness. It is therefore important to stress the 
influence of coffee production on the whole of 
agriculture: coffee's relative weight in the gross 
domestic farm product was almost 50% in 1977 
and it fell to 37% in 1985. The rest of the crops 
did not record any great changes, except those 
due to the weather and plant disease. 
It can thus be seen that macroeconomic sta-
bilization policies apparently did not have a very 
great effect on this performance. Moreover, in 
conjunction with the introduction of these poli-
cies, the State adopted a number of compensa-
tory measures, on top of the great external aid 
received. Thanks to these two factors, there was 
no need to resort in agriculture to the drastic 
measures of a shock policy. 
The farming sector was especially favoured 
by this compensatory action on the part of the 
State, for it was designed primarily to correct the 
drop in the demand for foodstuffs and subsidize 
basic inputs of external origin in order to keep 
food production stable. This goal was attained by 
the introduction of a price stabilization policy in 
1982, the purpose of which was to maintain the 
balance between the strength of output and the 
level of consumer prices. The external assistance 
was translated into a number of initiatives such 
as, for example, the Farm Productivity Incen-
tives Programme (IDB), which in conjunction 
with the tax policy increased the domestic 
demand by incorporation of technology without 
forcing production costs up by very much. 
The implementation of this set of measures 
was facilitated by the high domestic component 
in farm production, which is largely immune to 
external restrictions and increases in import 
prices. 
However, the crisis did have a greater effect 
on the farm exports sector, which also had a 
number of internal problems such as the consid-
erable adverse effects of the withdrawal of the 
banana companies. Thus, despite the establish-
ment of a number of programmes to stimulate 
the output of exportable farm goods, especially 
bananas and sugar cane, exports remained virtu-
ally unchanged. 
Nor did the devaluations influence export 
volumes. Coffee, bananas and sugar cane, which 
accounted for more than 54% of total foreign 
sales, were subject to export quotas. The deva-
luations did not have any great impact on other 
farm products either, for their domestic prices 
remained far above international prices; prices 
for the 1984/1985 harvest were 90% higher in 
the case of rice, 102% for maize and 50% for 
beans. It must therefore be assumed that the 
increased income resulting from implementa-
tion of this measure went mainly to export con-
sortiums and did not serve to stimulate 
producers. 
The results of various pieces of research con-
firm that one of the social costs of the adjust-
ment policies has been the drop in income from 
work; it is nevertheless admitted that the 
adverse effects were greater in urban areas and 
the impact on the countryside was less. Here 
again the domestic component helped to cushion 
the recessive effects. 
With respect to specific policies for agricul-
ture, the "Volvamos a la tierra" plan (Let Us 
Return to the Land) of the Government of Presi-
dent Monge sought to make agriculture and 
agro-industry the axis of the development pro-
cess. Five main action areas were defined for this 
purpose: agricultural production, agro-industrial 
integration, the agrarian issue, the support sys-
tem, and natural resources. 
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The public agricultural sector was then res-
tructured, the planning system was streng-
thened, a specialized irrigation and drainage 
service was established which brought together 
the resources dispersed among several bodies, 
and the Ministry of Agriculture was reorganized 
to increase and improve its regional presence 
and avoid duplication of functions. 
The following measures were implemented 
in 1982-1986: 
— Prices policy to stimulate and then stabilize 
production, thus favouring both producers 
and consumers. The period 1982-1983 had 
seen price increases of over 100% for pro-
ducers of rice, beans and sorghum, and 
somewhat smaller increases for producers of 
maize and eggs. The rises were moderate in 
1984 and 1985 as a result of the fall in infla-
tion and the stability of input prices. 
— Policy for support of banana production by 
means of an incentives plan which envis-
aged price compensation, assistance with 
disease control, and production incentives. 
The aim was to restore the competitiveness 
of banana production, which had been 
impaired by the high incidence of disease, 
the drop in prices, and other factors. 
— Quest for new alternatives for cane produc-
tion. Alcohol production was tried for this 
purpose, both for the home market and for 
export. This activity has been affected by the 
low international prices, but the area and the 
yields were nevertheless increased, and out-
put showed sustained growth. 
Policy of support for cocoa production. As a 
result of increased State support —through 
the Cocoa Promotion Programme— the 
sown area was expanded and the downward 
trend reversed. 
Policy of farm credit and insurance for the 
most important food crops. Finally, as a 
result of the introduction of these measures 
and the influence of imponderable external 
factors, banana output rose in 1983 and 1984 
before falling back in 1985 owing to the drop 
in prices and incidence of disease; cane pro-
duction increased but ran up against prob-
lems of overproduction and low 
international prices; livestock production 
grew between 6% and 10% from 1982, the 
year in which it had experienced a sharp fall; 
and the output of rice, maize and beans 
recorded increases which made it possible to 
meet the national requirements —except in 
the case of hard maize— and even to make 
some exports, although at subsidized prices, 
the cost of which had to be borne by the 
official marketing body. 
